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This paper examines unstated, but critical, social assumptions which underlie analyses of comput-
erization. It focuses on the popular, professional and scholarly literature which claims to describe 
the actual nature of computerization, the character of computer use, and the social choices and 
changes that result from computerization. This literature can be usefully segmented five ideal 
type genres: utopian, anti-utopian, social realism, social theory, and analytical reduction. Each 
genre is characterized and illustrated. The strengths and weaknesses of each genre are described. 
In the 1990s, there will be a large market for social analyses of computerization. Utopian analyses 
are most likely to domínate the popular and professional discourse. The empirically oriented 
accounts of social realism, social theory and analytical reduction, are likely to be much less 
common and also less commonly seen and read by computer professionals and policymakers. 
These genres are relatively subtle, portray a more ambiguous world, and have less rhetorical 
power to capture the imagination of readers. Even though they are more scientific, these 
empirically anchored genres don't seem to appeal to many scientists and engineers. It is ironic 
that computing -- often portrayed as an instrument of knowledge -- is primarily the subject of 
discourses whose knowledge claims are most suspect. Conversely, the discourses whose claims as 
valid knowledge are strongest seems to have much less appeal in the mass media and technologi-
cal communities. 
To appear in: Directions in Advanced Computer Systems, 1990. Doug Schuler, (Ed.) Norwood, N.J. 
Ablex Publishing Co. 
DISCOURSES ABOUT COMPUTERIZATION 
This paper examines unstated, but critical, assumptions which underlie social analyses of comput-
erization. I will facus on the popular, professional and scholarly literatures in which authors claim 
to describe the actual nature of computerization, the character of computer use, and the social 
choices and changes that result from computerization. 1 am not including certain kinds of writing 
which are also very important, but which do not claim to literally characterize the. empirical world, 
now or in the future: ethical studies, normative policy analyses, analyses of discourse (such as this 
article ), and works which are self-consciously fictional ( e.g., Kurt Vonnegut's Player Piano, John 
Brunner's Shockwave Rider). 
Every year thousands of articles and dozens of books comment on the meaning of new computer 
technologies far people, organizations, and the larger society. Since computer technologies are 
likely to improve significantly over the next few decades, we should expect periodic accounts of 
the social meanings of new technologies. Moreover, as we approach the year 2000, there will be a 
predictable flood of books and articles that examine the virtues and problems of computer 
technologies in the 2lst century. 
A large fraction of the literature about computing describes emerging technologies and the ways 
they can expand the limits of the possible. Faster, tinier computers can make it easier far people 
to access infarmation in a wider variety of places. Larger memories can make more data accessi-
ble. Richer display devices can help people communicate more readily with computerized systems 
through pictures and text. High speed networks, such as Usenet and Internet, link thousands of 
computer systems together in ways only dreamed of in 1970. The remarkable improvement in the 
capabilities of equipment from one decade to the next generate breathless excitement by 
researchers, developers, and entrepreneurs, as well as by the battalions of journalists who docu-
ment these events in the daily newspapers and weekly magazines. 
Accounts of the powerful infarmation processing capabilities of computer systems are usually 
central to many stories of computerization and social change. Authors write about these changes in 
technology and social life with different analytical and rhetorical strategi,es. Sorne authors enchant us 
with images of new technologies that offer exciting possibilities of manipulating large amounts of 
infarmation rapidly with little effort -- to enhance control, to create insights, to search far 
infarmation, and to facilitate cooperative work between people. Much less frequently, sorne 
authors examine a darker social vision in which any likely farm of computerization will amplify 
human misery -- people sacrificing their freedom to businesses and government agencies, people 
becoming very dependent on complex technologies that they don't comprehend, and sometimes 
the image of inadvertent global thermonuclear war. Both kinds of stories often reflect utopian and 
anti-utopian themes -- genres of social analysis which are about so'o years old, and which predates 
the social sciences by about 350 years. A different kind of investigative strategy and genres of 
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reporting one's insights are based on examining existing computerized systems as they are actually 
used in real social settings. These investigations and genres of writing which communicate them 
rest on the empiricist's faith that by examining the world as it is, we can learn something 
important of the worlds that might be. 1 will examine three majar genres which rest on empirical 
-observation: social realism, social theory, and analytical reduction. 1 am concerned with the 
strengths and limits of inquiries conceived and reported within these five genres: the two utopian 
genres and the three empirical genres. 1 will first examine utopian and anti-utopian analyses of 
computerization. 
TECHNOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM AND ANTI-UTOPIANISM 
Technological Utopianism 
Utopian thinkers portray societies in which people live ideal lives. The first such description 
appeared in Plato's Republic written sorne 2500 years ago. But the name Utopia derives from 
Thomas More, who published a story of an ideal society named Utopia in 1516. In Utopia people 
lived harmoniously and free of privation. His fanciful name, which meant "nowhere," has been 
picked up and applied to a whole tradition of writing· and thinking about the forms of society that 
would make many people happiest. There have been hundreds of utopian blueprints. They differ 
substantially in their details: sorne have focused on material abundance as th~ key to human 
happiness while other have advanced visions of happiness based on austere and simple ways of 
life. Sorne utopians advocate private property as a central social institution, while many place a 
primacy on shared property. 
The most obvious utopian sources are discourses which the authors identify as fictional accounts 
with traditional devices such as made up characters and fanciful dialogue. We are concerned with 
discourses about computerization which authors present as primarily realistic or factual accounts 
( and which are cataloged as non-fiction in bookstores and libraries ). We will show how sorne 
these discourses are shaped by the conventions of utopianism and anti-utopianism'. 
Edward Feigenbaum and Pamela McCorduck explicitly identify with utopian ideals when they 
clase their book about the social virtues of expert systems with this observation: 
... "utopian" also means something we have said many times and in many ways that 
we desire as a human good .... all this ... corresponds to Adam Smith's vision in The 
Wealth of Nations of a universal opulent society, a condition of plenty that frees 
the people from dependence and subordination to exercise true independence of 
spirit in autonomous actions (Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984:292). Tom 
Stonier ( 1983) also 
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illustrates the utopian tradition in writing about information technology. He ends his book about 
the way that information technologies can transform societies with this observation: 
To sum up, everyone an aristocrat, everyone a philosopher. A massively expanded 
educatiqn system to provide not only training and information about how to make 
a living, but also on how to live. In late industrial society, we stopped worrying 
about food. In late communicative society, we will stop worrying about material 
resources. And justas the industrial economy eliminated slavery, famine, and 
pestilence, so will the post-industrial economy eliminate authoritarianism, war, and 
strife. For the first time in history, the rate at which we will salve problems will 
exceed the rate at which they will appear. This will leave us to get on with the real 
business of the next century. To take care of each other. To fathom what it means 
to be human. To explore intelligence. To move out into space (Stonier, 1983:214)." 
Utopian images are common in many books and articles about computerization in society written 
by technologists and journalists. 1 am particularly interested in what can be leamed, and how we 
can be misled, by a particular brand of utopian thought -- technologi,cal utopianism. This line of 
analysis places the use of sorne specific technology, such as computers, nuclear energy, or low-
energy low-impact technologies, as key enabling elernents of a utopian vision1. Sometimes people 
will casually refer to exotic technologies -- like pocket computers which understand spoken lan-
guage -- as "utopian gadgets." Technological utopianism does not refer to these technologies with 
amazing capabilities. It refers to analyses in which the use of specific technologies plays a key role 
in shaping a benign social vision. In contrast, technologi,cal anti-utopianism examines how certain 
broad families of technology facilitates a social arder which is relentlessly harsh, destructive and 
miserable. George Orwell's novel 1984 is a representative of the genre. 
Utopian Elernents in Technological Blueprints 
Technologists who characterize new or future technologies often rest on utopian imagery when 
they examine their social meanings or implications. In 1948, befare there were any working elec-
tronic computers, Vannevar Bush set forth a vision of a fast, flexible, remotely accessible desk-
sized computer, called "memex" which would allow a researcher to electronically search through 
vast archives of artides, books, and notes electronically (Bush, 1988). He wrote: Wholly new 
forms of 
1 See Howard Segal's article on technological utopianism for 
a description of technological utopianism in the period between 1880-1930. The technologies of 
technological utopians can change from one era to another. But the assumption that a society which 
adopts the proper technologies will be harmonious and prosperous remains constant. 
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encyclopedia will appear, ready-made with a mesh of associative trails running 
through them, ready to be dropped into the memex, and there amplified. The 
lawyer has at his touch the associated opinions and decisions of his whole 
experience. The patent attorney has on call millions of issued patents, with familiar 
trails to every point of his client's interest. The physician, puzzled by a patient's 
reaction, strikes the trail established in studying an earlier similar case, and runs 
rapidly through analogous case histories, with side references to the classics far the 
pertinent anatomy and histology. The chemist, struggling with the synthesis of an 
organic compound, has all th~ chemical literature befare him in his laboratory, with 
trails fallowing the analogies of compounds, the side trails to their physical and 
chemical behavior. 
The historian, with a vast chronological account of people, parallels it with a skip 
trail which stops only at the salient items, and can fallow at any time, contempo-
rary trails which lead him all over civilization at a particular epoch. There is a new 
profession of trail blazers, those who find delight in the task of establishing useful 
trails through the enormous mass of the common record. The inheritance from the 
master becomes not only his additions to the world's record, but far his disciples, 
the entire scaffolding by which they were erected. 
Thus science may implement the ways in which man produces, stores, and consults 
the records of the race. (Bush, 1988:32). 
Bush continued by describing the ways in which the users' ability to associate items, gather 
together the useful clusters of infarmation that showed up during the search, and "instantly" 
project any or all of them onto displays far selective review, fast or slow. 
Presumably, man's spirit should be elevated if he can better review his shady past 
and analyze more completely and objectively his present problems." (Bush 1988:-
34). 
Bush envisioned a flexible, compliant research assistant able to artfully fish through vast archives 
of textual infarmation and gather the useful stuff embodied in an uncomplaining ever-ready 
machine2• A seductive image indeed! This vision was ever more remarkable because the image of 
digital computers that dominated scientific writing at the time -- and even dominates scientific 
thinking in today's talk about supercomputers -- was high speed calculation of numerical data. 
I could have examined any number of other technological visions -- of computer based instruction 
2 In another section of bis article, he presaged the invention of charge cards for department stores. 
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to transform education (Papert, 1980), or of information systems which would enable managers to 
more tightly control their business enterprises, etc. In part, these visions, like Bush's, rest on 
descriptions of computer-based devices and their information processing capabilities. In Fifth Gen-
eration , Edward Feigenbaum and Pamela McCorduck speculate about several possible applica-
tions of artificial intelligence to medicine, library searches, life at home, and help for the elderly. 
Feigenbaum and McCorduck speculate in terms similar to Bush -- by describing how these 
technologies might work under ideal conditions to help a person carry out socially useful actions. 
But they ignore key social conditions under which these technologies would be likely to be used. 
A remarkably talented engineer, Douglas Engelbart, was inspired by Bush's vision. About 15 years 
later, he assembled a brilliant research team at the Stanford Research Institute to build computer 
systems which resembled Bush's Memex. At the time, computer technology had advanced to the 
point where room-sized computers could be "time-shared" by dozens of people and accessed 
through video displays in their offices. Engelbart described his project "to auginent human 
intellect" in these terms: 
By 'augmenting human intellect' we mean increasing the capability of a man to 
approach a complex problem situation, gain comprehension to suit his particular 
needs, and to derive solutions to his problems .... we include the professional 
problems of diplomats, executives, social scientists, life scientists, physical scientists, 
attorneys, designers .... We refer to a way of life in an integrated doma~n where 
hunches, cut-and-try, intangibles, and the human 'feel for the situation' usefully 
coexist with powerful concepts, streamlined terminology and notation, sophisticated 
methods, and high powered electronic aids." (Engelbart, 1963). 
Engelbart's team designed a novel system which included technologies which began to appear in 
the marketplace in the mid-1980s, such as the mouse, hypertext, and context-sensitive help 
available with function keys3. Engelbart's team focussed on computer systems which would 
enhance the performance of groups of people working together. They developed text systems 
which allowed different group members to have their own views of the same body of text. They 
built an electronic mail system which enabled people to track messages sent about various tapies 
within their group. Today, there are sorne commercial "groupware" systems to facilitate the 
functioning of groups by allowing many people to work with common bodies of text, schedules, 
etc. Visions like Bush's and Engelbart's, from which I have drawn tiny excerpts, serve as an 
inspiration for many technologists and affectionados of new technologies. 
3 These technological innovations are most frequently used in single user systems on microcom-
puters such as Apple Mclntoshs and IBM Pes for prosaic tasks like editing memos and papers. 
Engelbart's team seems to have done little to actually enhance the ability of then kirids of profes-
sionals he described to actually solve practica! problems. 
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Visions like Bush's and Engelbart's are also flawed in the way they characterize technologies, 
people, and social life. They emphasize the ways that a technology should work ideally, under 
conditions where all the participants are highly cooperative to make things work their best. Sorne 
people call the field which researches and develops computer systems to support groups activities 
"computer supported cooperative work (CSCW)." In this label, the work of groups is implied to 
be cooperative by definition. Other kinds of social relationships in work groups -- such as those 
marked by conflict, competition, coercion, and even combat, are denied to exist by definition. 
In a recent issue of PC Magazine, Frank Derfler Jr. (1989) argued that group scheduling or 
calendaring softw_are was a critica! module of "workgroup productivity software," although other 
modules, such as text processing and electronic mail, are important to make a more usable system. 
Derfler goes on to say: 
Scheduling three or more busy people for a meeting, along with arranging for a 
conference room and a slide projector, can be a frustrating and time-consuming 
task, requiring at least three phone calls. If one person or facility isn't available at 
the time the other people or facilities are, a whole series of negotiations begins. 
Mathematicians refer to it as progressive approximation; you ( or your secretary 
making the arrangements) call it frustration. Befare the scheduling problem is re-
solved, the nurnber of people involved and phone calls made may have increased 
dramatically. 
Scheduling programs ... vary in how they confirm proposed events. The simpler 
packages assume that if the event fits on the calendar, that the people scheduled 
to attend will be there. Other programs ask for confirmation, while sorne go as far 
as to tie into electronic mail modules for notification . 
.... The best scheduling software is utterly useless if people aren't willing to play 
the game by keeping their personal calendars current. Obviously, these personal 
calendars are at the heart of the group scheduling process-- calendars that aren't 
readily available or easy to use will never be maintained by group participants. 
With this in mind, it seems imperative that these programs allow you to run the 
personal calendar module (interactively while running other programs) and make it 
easy to use (Derfler, 1989:248). 
Derfler describes and critically evaluates key features of sorne majar programs, and describes the 
best of these packages as d.reams come true for busy professionals and managers. Like Vannevar 
Bush, Feigenbaum and McCorduck, he describes how these programs can facilitate various kids of 
group activities, such as scheduling, under the best of conditions: machines are up and running 
properly; people have immediate access to the shared system to keep their calendars up-to-date; 
people actually keep their calendars up-to-date. U nfortunately, like many journalists, he does not 
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explain what social conditions make these packages most effective -- or even usable at ali. 
Derfler's article is titled "Imposing Efficiency," but he never describes why or how efficiency would .. 
be irnposed by anyone involved with the systems he reviews. In discussing meeting scheduling, he 
observes, "The best scheduling software is utterly useless if people aren't willing to play the game 
by keeping their personal calendars current." However, he immediately moves from this central 
observation to a technical point: that the scheduling software should be designed so that it can 
"pop-up" whenever a person is running sorne other application~ That way, if a person. schedules a 
meeting by telephone when he is doirig something else, like writing a memo, he can promptly 
update his electronic calendars with a minimum of interruption. That's a valid point. But Derfler 
never goes beyond the technical observation to examine the social practices of "imposed efficien-
cies," specifically the requirement that users accept and cooperate with the demands of managers 
who are trying to improve productivity through computerized systems. 
Utopian Visions ou;:ornputerized Societies 
So far, our examples focus on computer-based systems used by relatively small groups. But 
powerful images that link computerization and larger scale social change have entered ordinary 
language through newspapers, popular books, and advertisements. Terms like "computer revolu-
tion," "information society," "knowledge worker," "computer-mediated work," "intelligent machine". 
These catch phrases have strong metaphorical associations. They are often introduced by authors 
to advance positive exciting images of computerization. 
These new terms are often worked into common usage. by journalists and authors who write far 
popular audiences. We live in a period of tremendous social changes. And sometimes new terms 
can help better capture emerging social patterns or new kinds oftechnologies, than can our 
conventional language. But the way that many authors casually use these terms often reflects 
important unexamined and often questionable social assumptions. 
Alvin Toffler, helped stimulate enthusiasm far computerization in these popular terms in his best 
seller The Third Wave. He characterized majar social transformations in terms of large shifts in 
the organization of society -- driven by technological change. The "Second Wave" was the shift 
from agricultura! societies to industrial societies. He contrasts industrial ways of organizing 
societies with new social trends that he links to computer and microelectronic technologies. 
Toffler is masterful in succinctly suggesting majar social changes in succinct breathless prose. He 
also invented sorne of his own terminology to help characterize key social changes -- terms like 
second wave, third wave, electronic cottage, infosphere, technosphere, prosumer, intelligent 
environment, etc. Many of his new terms did not become commonly accepted. Even so, they help 
frame a seductive description of social change, as this excerpt from his chapter, "The Intelligent 
Environment" illustrates his approach: Today, as we construct 
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a new infa-sphere far a Third Wave civilization, we are imparting to the "dead" 
environment around us, not life, but intelligence. A key to this revolutionary 
advances, of course, the computer (Toffler, 1980:168) .... 
As miniaturization advanced, with lightening rapidity, as computer capacity soared 
and prices per function plunged, small cheap powerful minicomputers began to 
sprout everywhere. Every branch factory, laboratory, sales office, or engineering 
department claimed its own .... The brainpower of the computer ... was "distribut-
ed." This dispersion of computer intelligence is now moving ahead at high speed 
(Toffler, 1980:169). 
The dispersa! of computers in the home, not to mentían their inte~connection in 
ramified networks, represents another advance in the construction of an intelligent 
environment. Yet even this is not all. The spread of machine intelligence reaches 
another level altogether with the arrival of microprocessors and microcomputers, 
those tiny chips of congealed intelligence that are about to become a part, it 
seems, of nearly all the things we make and use (Toffler, 1980:170) .... 
What is inescapably clear, however, whatever we choose to believe, is that we are 
altering our infa-sphere fundamentally .... we are adding a whole new strata of 
communication to the social system. The emerging Third Wave infa-sphere makes 
that of the Second Wave era - dominated by its mass media, the post office, and 
the telephone - seem hopelessly primitive by contrast. (Toffler, 1980:172) .... 
In all previous societies, the infasphere4 provided the means for communication 
between human beings. The Third Wave multiplies these means. But it also pro-
vides powerful facilities, far the first time in history, far machine-to-machine com-
munication, and, even more astonishing, for conversation between humans and the 
intelligent environment around them. When we stand back and look_ at the larger 
picture, it becomes clear that the revolution in the infa-sphere is at least as 
dramatic as that of the technosphere -- in the energy system and the technological 
base of society. The work of constructing a new civilization is racing farward on 
many levels at once (Toffler, 1980:177-178)." 
Toffler's breathless enthusiasm can be contagious -- but also stymies critica! thought. Like Derfler, 
he assumes that key people -- e.g., administrators and purchasing agents -- will share his enthusi-
asm for the new technologies. Toffler also ignores cost constraints: today, for example, many 
4 Toffler defines an info-sphere as "comm~nication channels through which individuals and mass 
messages could be distributed as goods or raw materials (Toffler, 1980:35)." 
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small colleges and universities are unable to provide adequate computer support for faculty and 
students; community groups and poorer organizations also have trouble affording adequate 
computer systems. 
Toffler illustrates changes in the infosphere with a large commercial computer-communication and 
messaging system which has thousands of individual and corporate subscribers: the So urce (Toffler 
1980:169). Today, he could multiply that example manifold with the emergence of competing com-
mercial systems, such as Compuserve and Genie, as well as tens. of thousands of individually 
owned computerized bulletin boards that people have set up in hundreds of cities and towns. 
However, there have been a myriad of other changes in the information environment in the 
United States which are not quite as exciting to people who would like to see a more thoughtful 
culture. For example, television has become a majar source of information about world events for 
many children and adults. The popular television shows include soap operas, sitcoms, and rock 
video television networks like MTV. Television news, the most popular "factual" kind of television 
programming, slices stories into salami-thin 30-90 second segments. Moreover, there is sorne 
evidence that functional illiteracy is rising in the United States. The problems .of literacy in the 
United States are probably not a byproduct of television's popularity. But it is hard to take Toffle-
r's optimistic account seriously when a large fraction of the population has trouble understanding 
key parts of the instruction manuals for automobiles and for commonplace home appliances, like 
refrigerators and televisions. 
Toffler opens up important questions about the way that information technologies alter the ways 
that people perceive information, the kinds of information they can get easily, and how they han-
dle the information they get. But his account -- like many popular accou.nts -- caricatures the 
.answers by using only illust:rations which support his generally buoyant theses. And he skillfully 
sidesteps tough questions while creating excitement (such as, "The work of constructing a new 
civilization is racing forward on many levels at once."). 
Toffler's vision is not dated, however. This is an excerpt from a recent article by two respected 
information systems scholars: 
"The office of the late 1990s can now be envisioned: lts staff of professionals and 
managers are surrounded by intelligent devices that speak, listen, or interact with 
them to determine what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done. Contacts 
with other departments, other divisions, customers, vendors, and other organiza-
tions are made with little effort and without human intervention. Behind the 
scenes, systems are being developed by system developers equipped with versatile 
and highly intégrated software." (Straub and Wetherbe, 1989:1338) 
This vision is similar to Toffler's, but less poetic. It portrays computerized information systems and 
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offices similar to a spaceshi.P in which the crew is highly automated and staffed with robots. John 
Sculley, Chairman of the Board of the Apple Computer Corporation, recently published an article 
in Communications of the ACM which advocates the development of simulation, hypermedia and 
artificial intelligence to strengthen the United States economy and educational systems (Sculley, 
i989). He argued by analogy with the role of print in the Renaissance. Sculley claims that print 
technology catalyzed the Renaissance which broke the stranglehold of the church and feudal 
interests on the population of Europe. He argues that computer systems based on hypermedia, 
simulation, and artificial intelligence applied to education are the appropriate means for a similar 
transformation today. Sculley's article is typical of sorne which try to excite a positive sense of 
purpose for developers and users of new computer technologies by referring to big historical 
chqnges such as the Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution. They excite hope for computer-
iza~ion by linking it to positive social ideals which they anchor in oversimplified and sometimes 
distorted historical accounts5. 
I have spent substantial space examining technological l,ltopianism because it is a common genre 
for exploring the social meaning of new and future technologies. And it is the genre which I 
believe is most influential in the technological communities. 
TECHNOLOGICAL ANTI-UTOPIANISM 
There is a relatively small literature criticizing sorne of the claims made about the social virtues of · 
different computerization strategies. The anti-utopian critiques portray computerization --in 
almost any farm the analyst can conceive -- as likely to degrade social life. ( eg., Reinecke, 1984; 
5 Sculley distorted the bases of economic expansion during the Renaissance. The Renaissance first 
mushroomed in Italy in the 15th century. While printing helped stimulate literacy, the simple presence 
of printing presses didn't automatically stimulate a cultural revolution. Important social groups had 
to mobilize as well. The political fragmentation of Italy better facilitated the spread of literacy, new 
trends in the arts, and the reviva! of classical learning. By the end of the Renaissance', Italy was not 
economically much wealthier than at the beginning. The countries which built international colonial 
empires -- Spain. and England -- accumulated the mosi immense wealth (in their royal treasuries ). 
Spain was one of the more intellectually repressive countries in 16th century Europe. Italy was 
politically fragmented into numerous political entities befare the Renaissance and the Italian states 
were even weaker afterwards, although cities like Florence were. a Mecca for artists from all over 
Euro pe. · 
The Renaissance was not simply an exciting intellectual movement. Befare the Renaissance, the 
Roman Catholic Church hada virtual monopoly on the skills of reading and writing. The battles to 
expand literacy, and to place man at the center of the world -- Renaissance Humanism -- was faught 
by a variety of interests against the power of the Church. And Church officials fought back -- with 
inquisitions, excommunications, and swords -- as well as with talk and ink. See Dunlop and Kling 
( 1991) for a more detailed critique of Sculley's argument. 
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Weizenbaum, 1976; Buesmans and Wieckert, 1989). I will illustrate this genre with two examples. 
Weizenbaum's Computer Power and Human Reason is a complex critique of computerized 
decision systems which their users and managers do not or cannot understand. He amplifies the · 
underside of every computerized system which he discusses. Far example, ,he criticizes visions of 
computerized databases which record historical data (like Vannevar Bush's Memex, which I de- . 
scribed earlier), because they usually elliminate impartant information which is too complex or 
costly to include: 
.... The computer has thus begun to be an instrument far the destruction of 
history. Far when society legitimates only those "data" that are in one standard 
format, then history, memory itself, is annihilated. The New York Times has already 
begun to build a "data bank" of current events. Of course, only those data that are 
easily derivable as by-products of typesetting machines are admissible to the 
system. As the number of subscribers to this system grows, as they learn to rely 
more and more upan "all the news that [was once] fit to print,"6 as The Times 
proudly identifies its editorial policy, how long will it be befare what counts as fact 
is determined by the system, befare all other knowledge, all memory, is simply 
declared illegitimate? Soon a supersystem will be built, based on the New York 
Times' data bank (ar one very much like it), from which "historians" will make 
inferences about what "really" happened, about who is connected to whom, and 
about the "real" logic of events (Weizenbaum, 1976:238) .... 
Weizenbaum's observations gain more force when one realizes that journalists don't simply repart 
"the facts." They often rely upan standard kinds of sources, voices of publicly legitimate authority, 
in framing stories. Far example, when a university alters a currículum, deans and professars are 
more likely to have a voice in the resulting news story than are students. Gaye Tuchman 
characterized reparters in search of a story as casting a selective "newsnet" around their favorite 
kinds of sources. Journalists rarely cast their nets to give equal voiee to all kinds of informed 
parties. While reporters are much more likely to go to "the grass roots" today than they were in 
the days of Vannevar Bush, each newspaper prints a mix of stories in a style which reflects a 
relatively stable character. Usually, Even if the mastheads were interchanged, one would not 
confuse the New York Times with a small town weekly newspaper7• Without special design, noth-
ing in the database technology would be likely to give a user a clue about its real limitations in 
representing a narrow range of perspectives. And, yet, its convenience might make it very temp-
ting far a busy professional to rely on it as a primary source, without appreciating its limitations. 
That is the cautionary note that one might draw from Weizenbaum's bitter observations. But 
6 The New York Times' masthead slogan is "all the news that's fit to 
print." 7 Far a very readable and revealing account about the way that newspapers shape the 
reports that appear as "news," see Manhoff and Schudson (1986). 
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Weizenbaum's argument is primarily polemical. He doesn't discuss any virtues of news databases 
or conditions under which they might not have the deleterious problems he identifies. News data-
bases can also substantially assist in useful research as long as they do not become a sale source 
of information. Professional historians who have developed strong criteria for verifying events with 
original sources may be less likely to beco me their prisoners than many professionals ( and 
students) who find them efficacious and seductive, despite their limitations. Moreover, 
Weizenbaum speaks with authority about future events ("soon a supersystem will be built...") 
Discussions of computerization and work have been a majar tapie for both utopian and anti-
utopian analysts (see lacona and Kling, 1987). Sorne authors argue that computerization has 
systematically degraded clerical work through a pattern of industrialization (Braverman, 1974). 
Sorne go farther and argue that the computerization of clerical work sets the stage for the indus-
trialization of professional work as well (Mowshowitz, 1986; Perrolle, 1986). Mowshowitz (1986) 
summarizes his sharp vision in these concise terms: 
Our principal point is that the lessons of the factory are the guiding principies of 
office automation. In large offices, clerical work has already been transformed into 
factory-like production systems. The latest technology -- office automation -- is 
simply being used to consolidate and further a well-established trend. For most 
clerical workers, this spells an intensification of factory discipline. For many 
professionals and managers, it signals a gradual loss of autonomy, task fragmenta-
tion and closer supervision -- courtesy of computerized monitoring. Communica-
tion and interaction will increasingly be mediated by computer. Work will become 
more abstract ... and opportunities for direct social interaction will diminish. 
Like Weizenbaum, Mowshowitz writes authoritatively about distressing future events. He doesn't 
examine the possibility that many professionals will use their occupational power to resist the loss 
of autonomy and fragmented jobs that he describes. Nor does he examine how sorne professionals 
have exploited computerization to their advantage -- in making their jobs more interesting and 
complex. Elsewhere in his article, he criticizes studies which examine such variations as con-
cerned with "minutiae." Mowshowitz follows Braverman's line of argument that (under capitalism), 
managers will computerize so as to enhance their control by degrading working conditions. 
Braverman's thesis has been subject to significant discussion and found wanting, because it doesn't 
account for other processes that shape computerization ( such as enhancing control over expensive 
resources other than labor or improving product quality in the face of competition).8 Braverman's 
thesis is anti-utopian insofar as only one tragic outcome is likely. It is an important line of 
argument insofar as it locates computerization efforts within a logic of managerial interests, and 
8 See Kuhn (1989) for a careful empirical examination of Braverman's thesis. See also Wood 
(1989:10-11) for a discussion of the literature about Braverman's thesis. 
12 
bighlights the importance of controlling labor as a key managerial interest. Utopian and anti-
. utopian analysts paint their portraits of computerization with monochromatic brushes: white or 
black. The anti-utopians' characterizations of the tragic possibilities of computerization provide an 
essential counterbalance to the giddy-headed optimism of the utopian accounts. The romances 
and tragedies are not ali identical. For example, sorne anti-utopian writings examine the 
possibilities of computerized systems for coercion, while others emphasize alienation. But the 
utopian and anti-utopian genres have sorne important inherent limitations which we now examine. 
STRENGTHS and LIMITS of UTOPIAN ANALYSES 
1 have illustrated sorne utopian and anti-utopian analyses of computerization, and commented on 
sorne of their strengths and weaknesses in passing. To what extent are· utopian or anti-utopian 
visions helpful in understanding the social possibilities of computerization? Despite key limita-
tions which I shall characterize below, 1 see utopian and anti-utopian analyses as important and 
legitimate forms of speculative inquiry. Questions about the social consequences of new technolo-
gies are central to choices about paths for development, levels of social investment, and regulatory 
policies all merit analysis of future possibilities. Ali such analyses rest on theories of the interplay 
between technological developments and social life. Utopian and anti-utopian themes are the 
most common in this culture. 1 will examine important alternatives to utopian and anti-utopian 
analyses in the next section -- social realism, social theory, and analytical reduction. 
Utopian visions are sometimes characterized as "reality transcending" (Kumar, 1987). They 
important roles in stimulating hope and giving people a positive sense of direction. But they can 
mislead when their architects exaggerate the likelihood of easy and desirable social changes. 
Writing about technological utopianism in the 1930s, White, Pilgrim and Tasjian ( 1986:335) 
comment: 
Belief in the limitless future potential of the machine had both its positive and 
negative aspects. During the 1930s this almost blind faith in the power of the 
machine to make the world a better place helped hold a badly shattered nation 
together .... These science fiction fantasies contributed to an almost naive approach 
to serious problems and a denial of problems that could already be foreseen. 
Anti-utopian writing are far less popular. They serve as an important counterbalance to techno-
logical utopianism. But they could encourage a comparably naive sense of despair and inaction. 
Utopian and anti-utopian visions embody extreme assumptions about technology and human 
behavior. But their simplicity gives them great clarity and makes them easy to grasp -- to enjoy or 
- 1 
to abhor. They can resonate with our dreams or nightmares. Consequently, they have immense 
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influence in shaping the discussions (and real directions) of computerization. Their simplicity is 
their greatest strength, and also a point of entry to sorne disastrous flaws which I examine now. 
Conflict 
Utopian analysts portray a world which is free of substantial conflict. Anti-utopians usually portray 
certain fundamental conflicts such as between social classes (Mowshowitz, 1976 and 1986) or 
between government agencies and the public (Burnham, 1983) as almost unalterably unbalanced. 
One side virtually dominates while the other side mounts negligible resistance. Neither extreme 
characterizes the world in which social conflicts are important but in which coalitions draw 
complex lines and the intensity of conflict varies in place and time. 
The United States was founded premises that were utopian premises in the 1700s. The Declara-
tion of Independence asserts that "all men were created equal" and that they would be should be 
guaranteed the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This was in significant contrast 
to the political cultures of the European monarchies of the time; where the rule of the king or 
queen, and her nobles, most of whom were elected by heredity, determlned peoples' fates. Of 
course,' asserting this right as universal didn't immediately make it so9. 
Utopian ideals are hard to realize. Their advocates often have to fight hatd to change social 
practices to better fit their ideals. The United States broke free of the English Crown through a 
four year war. Almost 200 yea~s later, Martin Luther King and others advanced the cause of 
improved civil rights in the United States through aggressive confrontations: marches, rallies, court 
injunctions and sit ins, as well as through more quite persuasion. These social changes which 
altered the balance of privilege and exploitation did not come quietly and peacefully. I have 
suggested how Sculley underplays the levei of conflict between the Catholic Church and other 
groups during the Renaissance and thereby transforms a bloody period into one in which a. key 
technology ( the printing press) became an agent of bloodless social change. 
Distribution of Knowledge 
In utopian analyses of computerization, people have whatever skills they need to adequately use 
systems and to resolve problems as they arise. Anti-utopian analyses vary in their accounts of 
technological skills. Sometimes everyone is adequately skilled, but are using technologies in ways 
that undermine important social values. In other anti-utopian accounts, ~any people are confused 
9 Slaves, for example, were legally property who ~ould be, bought and sold, told where to live and 
broken apart from their families until 1865. Women were not allowed to vote until 1919. But even 
in 1963, Martin Luther King's majar speech about a country free of racial discrimination was called 
"I Have a Dream" not "An Old Dream Has Now Come True." 
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about key social relationships and the use of technologies. In these later analyses, either elites 
control key skills or sometimes no one has key knowledge (as in Weizenbaum's account of 
"incomprehensible systems."). These accounts rarely portray people's technological skills as being 
distributed in complex ways: man:y people as having adequate technical skills for sorne of their 
activities, and muddling through on others with help from co-workers or consultants, and being 
confused about a few technological activities. 
Problems Caused by Technological Development 
Technological utopians sometimes recognize that new technologies cause new problems -- but 
these are to be solved with additional technologies. Buckminster F,uller argued that it was difficult 
and almost pointless to teach people to drive very cautiously and to harass them with rigid laws. 
He argued for safer cars rather than for changing human behavior. Today's discussions about 
computerized "smart cars" rather than smart drivers runs along a parallel line. Technological 
utopians would usually rather see government funds invested in stimulating the development of 
new technologies rather than increasing the scale and scope of regulatory bureaucracies. 
In contrast, anti-utopians often u.nderstate the social value .ºf technological innovations and the 
way in which all technologies pose problems. When motor cars first became popular in the early 
20th century, they were viewed as a dean technology. Sorne of the larger cities had annoying 
pollution problems from another primary transportation technology -- horses. On rainy days, large 
pools of horse manure would form on busy street corners, and walking was somewhat hazardous 
for pedestrians. By the 1950s, we began to.view cars as a majar polluting technology, since smog 
visibly dirtied the air of majar cities. 
Necessity of Technological Effects 
Technological utopian and anti-utopian analysts suggest that the changes they foresee are virtually 
certain to happen if a technology is developed and disseminated. Their arguments gain rhetorical 
force through linear logics and the absence of important contingencies. This causal simplification 
is, in our view, a fatal flaw of utopian and anti-utopian speculations. They explore the character of 
possible social changes as if they were the only likely social changes. 
BEYOND THE UTOPIAN IMPULSE: 
SOCIAL REALISM, SOCIAL THEORY and ANALYfICAL REDUCTION 
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In the previous section, I identified four majar problems of utopian and anti-utopian analyses 
which I see as characteristic of these genres. Not all utopian (or anti-utopian analyses) are equally 
coherent10, clear, or credible. But other forms of social analysis can also be incoherent or 
baseless. So clarity does not differentiate between utopian analyses and other modes of social 
analysis. 
Attractive alternatives to utopian analysis should be more credible in characterizing conflict in a 
social arder, the distribution of knowledge, and ways of solving problems that arise from new 
technologies. Most important, they would also identify the social contingencies which make 
technologies (un)workable and social changes benign or harmful far various social groups. I 
briefly identify three alternatives: social realism, social theory and analytical reduction. Analyses in 
these three genres often acknowledge social conflict, yet are more open-ended and contingent 
than both genres of utopian analysis. 
Social Realism. 
I use the label "social realism" to characterize a genre which uses empirical data to examines 
computerization as it is actually practiced and experienced. Social realists write their articles and 
books with a tacit label: "/ have carefully obsen;ed and examined computerization in sorne key social 
settings and 1 will tell you how it really is." The most common methods are those of journalism 
( e.g., Salema, 1985) and the social sciences, such as critical inquiries ( e.g., Forester 1989), and 
ethnography ( e.g., Kling, 1978; Laudan, 1986). But the genre is best characterized by the efforts 
of authors to communicate their understanding of computerization as it "really works" based on 
reporting fine grained empirical detail ( e.g., Stoll, 1989; Office of Technology Assessment, 1986). 
Social realism gains its force through gritty observations about the social worlds in which 
computer systems will be used. 
An interesting example of social realism is found in a study of instructional computing in 
classrooms by Sheingold, Hawkins and Char (1984). They report on a number of ethnographic 
studies of instructional computing in specific classrooms, including the use of databases, a 
10 Sometimes utopian and anti-utopian analyses have interna! contradictions. Far example, one can 
ask of Feigenbaum and McCorduck how they expect people to engage in socially important activities 
which reap no profit (such as helping people in roadside accidents) when the dominant virtue in their 
Smithian world is to be individual greed. Othertimes, it is simply unclear how a disadvantaged social 
group can move from where it is to the more munificent utopian social arder. In anti-utopian scenar-
ios, it is sometimes unclear why a moderately advantaged group would tolerate relentless exploitation 
( see, far example, Mowshowitz above ). 
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mathematical game, and LOGO programming. They carefully report different ways that teachers 
conceptualize the relationship between these programs and instruction (with resulting differences 
in ways that they integrate them into their classes). They also report. a variety of ways that 
students use the programs, from those that fit traditional conceptions of media in learning to 
those that simply get the work done. The cute title of the paper, "I'm the thinkist, you're the 
typist" comes from their obs~rvation of the educationally inappropriate way that two girls divided 
their efforts in programming with LOGO. 
Another example of social realism is Grudin's (1989) analysis of the social assumptions that 
designers and advocates of groupware make about the use of these packages. He argues that the 
meeting scheduling systems 'Championed by Derfler (1989) work best when their users all have 
secretaries to help keep their calendars up-to-date. These packages are especially attractive to 
managers, who often have secretaries, and who often want to schedule meetings with subordi-
nates. They can be a burden to professionals who do not have secretaria! support. They can also 
burden people who are away from their desks in meetings qut of their offices part of the day, 
where they are making new commitments which are not reflected in their shared calendars. More 
deeply, Grudin examines computer applications with a model of organizations in which resources 
and authority are not equally distributed. Grudin places computer systems in work worlds in which 
there is a political economy of effort -- sorne people can generate work far others. And the 
people who generate work may not have to work as hard as do the people who have to met their 
requirements. Grudin's article examines the social contingencies which make these systems 
(un)workable. And Grudin does not paint all groupware with a black brush. 
Social realism offers us frank portrait but suffers from particularism. Authors in this genre rarely 
are explicit in drawing concepts or themes which generalize across technologies and social settings 
from the rich literature about the social character of computerization, or in contrasting their study 
with many other studies or accounts in the computerization literature. Moreover, it is always 
debatable what the present can tell us about what the future can be like if social arrangements or 
technologies are substantially transformed. 
Social Theory 
In contrast with social realism, theoretical analysts explicitly develop or test concepts and theories 
that transcend specific situations. Unlike utopian and anti-utopian accounts, social theoretical 
works are not "reality transcending." But they are situation transcending. Sorne examples are rein-
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forcement politics (Danziger, Dutton, Kling and Kraemer, 1982)11, web models (Kling and 
Scacchi, 1982; Kling, 1987), Judith Perrolle's explication of social control theories (Perrolle, 1988), 
and Terry Winograd's (1988) explication of language-action theory. 
Web models illustrate this kind of theoretical work. Walsham, Symons and Waema (1988) char-
acterize web models in these terms: 
"The basic tenet of web models (Kling and Scacchi, 1982) is that a computer 
system is best conceptualized as an ensemble of equipment, applications and tech-
niques with identifiable information processing capabilities. Each computing 
resource has costs and skill requirements which are only partially identifiable; in 
addiction to its functional capabilities as an information processing tool it is a 
social object which may be highly charged with meaning. There is no specially 
separable 'human factor' far information systems: the development and routine 
operations of computer-based technologies hinge on many human judgement and 
actions, often influenced by political interests, structural constraints, and partici-
pants' definition of their situations. 
The network of producers and consumers around the focal computing resource is 
termed the 'production lattice'; the interdependencies in this network form the 
'web' from which the model derives its name. The production lattice is a social 
organization which is itself embedded in a larger matrix of social and economic 
relations ('macrostructure') and is dependent upan a local infrastructure. Accord-
ing to web models, these macrostructures and local infrastructures direct the kind 
of computer-based service available at each nade of the production lattice, and 
since they evolve over time computing developments are shaped by a set of histori-
cal commitments. In short, web models view information systems as 'complex 
social objects constrained by their context, infrastructure and history' (Kling and 
Scacchi, 1982)." 
Web analyses are action-oriented and examine the political interplay of coalitions in structured --
but somewhat fluid -- settings (Kling, 1987). The main organizing concepts were a "focal comput-
ing technology" which was the center of analysis, the infrastructure which supported its develop-
ment and operation (including production lattices ), its context of development and use, and a 
history of organizational commitments which structured these arrangements. Researchers have 
applied web models to better understand a variety of cases, including dilemmas of developing the 
11 Reinforcement politics holds that organizations computerize so that actors with most resources 
gain more influence, while those with fewer resources lose subsequent influence. 
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Worldwide Military Command and Control System, dilemmas of converting complex inventory 
control systems in manufacturing firms, the development of software in insurance firms, and the 
ways in which desktop computerization changes worklife in offices. 
Social theoretical studies of computerization offer the traditional virtues of theory: relatively 
concise explanations. But they are much less accessible to a broad audience than utopian, anti-
utopian and social realist accounts because of their intellectual demands: their (necessary) use of 
specialized terms and their frequent abstraction from the kinds of concrete situations that readers 
can readily visualize and perhaps identify with. 
The contrast between social realism and social theory, as ideal types, is rather clear. And it is easy 
to find books and articles which illustrate these types. All social analyses are imbued with 
theoretical assumptions, however implícit (Kling, 1980). Journalists and others who are not trained 
in the social sciences are much more likely to write as social realists rather than as social theorists. 
Social scientists are more capable of developing theoretical inquiries, but they are more likely to 
publish realist discourses about computerization or documents which apply existing theory to 
sharpen realist accounts. I believe that there a shortage of good theoretical explorations. 
Analytical Reduction 
Sorne scholars organize their social investigations into computerization by working within a tightly 
defined conceptual framework. They identify a few key concepts, sometimes derived from theory 
or abstracted from a group of studies, and examine them in new settings. If they adopt a strictly 
quantitative social science approach, they operationalize all of their key concepts into variables, 
measure them, examine how behaviors are distributed along the variables and via mathematical 
relationships between variables ( e.g., correlations). While completely quantitative studies represent 
ideal examples of this genre, studies which focus on a few qualitatively described dimensions share 
enough key characteristics to be appropriate to group with them also. 
A recent paper by Starr Roxanne Hiltz (1988) on the ways that computer conferencing systems 
alter productivity of groups illustrates the quantitative version of the genre. Hiltz administered 
questionnaires to people who used four different computer conferencing system befare and ·after 
a period of use. She grouped four survey questions items into a summary measure of productivity 
( e.g., quality of work with system, quantity of work with system, overall usefulness of system and 
utility of system in reaching other people). She measured many aspects of the groups, their work, 
their usage of the conferencing systems, and the features of the systems. She bases her conclu-
sions on the magnitude of quantitative relationships between the variables which she measured. 
For example, she notes: 
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The strongest correlates of productivity improvements for all four systems are pre-
use expectations about whether the system would increase productivity. Other 
determinants relate to the group context: leadership skill is important and strong 
competitive feelings may hamper productivity (Hiltz, 1988:1449). 
In a similarly analytical approach, Suzanne lacona and I (1988) examined the extent to which the 
development of a complex computerized inventory control system could best be explained by one 
of three different kinds of organizational choices processes: rational decision making, organiza-
tional drift, and partisan politics12. In this study we presented a qualitative case study, and then 
systematically examined it for evidence in the form of episodes and social relationships which 
would support or undermine each of these three models of organizational choice. 
1 label this genre as analytical reduction because the ·authors reduce their accounts of the social 
world and computer technologies to a few key concepts. Depending on one's view, this approach 
represents the best or worst of social science inquiry. Those who see it as a valuable genre 
appreciate the way that the authors13 critically examine key concepts and examine the extent to 
which they shed insight into the social world of computing. They believe that our best hope for 
systematically understanding the social character of computerization will come from studies in this 
genre. Those who criticize, or sometimes even despise analytical reduction, see it as arcane and 
inaccessible except to academic specialists. They usually prefer social realist studies because they 
more easily accessible and identifiably concrete. Further, the quantitative reductions are less likely 
to characterize the shifts of understandings that participants have over time, the nature of unusual 
but important events, or even the occasions when computerization becomes comical or tragic. 
HYBRID DISCOURSES 
1 have identified five genres of investigation and writing as ideal types. 1 try to classify works into 
a genre by using criteria such as these: if the analysis focuses on problems, are good outcomes 
possible ( and the conditions which lead to them characterized)? Conversely if the analysis focusses 
on the way that computerization leads to a benign world, how well are the character of potential 
problems and their causes identified? 
While many articles and books clearly fit one of these genres, sorne works are hybrid. For 
example, sorne works combine key facets of social realism and anti-utopianism. David Burnham's 
12 We found the greatest support for partisan political models of organizational choice governing 
the developmental trajectory of computerization in this case. 
13 The authors of this genre are almost always academics or people with substantial academic 
training. 
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The Rise of the Computer State is a passionate examination of the way that many computerized 
data systems operated by credit reporting agencies, medical information bureaus, police agencies 
and so on reduce personal privacy in the United States. His book reports his investigation of 
severa! large data systems based on dozens of interviews. Burnham is insightful in identifying the 
ways that large scale personal information systems have eroded personal privacy. He views each 
system as a medium for personal abuse -- as examples of organizations intruding unfairly upan 
people's private lives. For example, he discusses the Parent Locator System which uses matching 
on a complex array of Federal and Sta te systems to track parents ( usually fathers) who avoid 
paying legally mandated child support by hiding, often in another state. In this discussion he criti-
cizes the system, sometimes obliquely. But he doesn't suggest that it has any socially redeeming 
value, even if, on balance, he would disagree with the tradeoffs made by using it. 1 see his book as 
reflecting a strong anti-utopian orientation mixed with a social realist format. Burnham's anti-
utopianism is particularly clear when bis book is read in contrast with Ken Laudon's Dossier 
Society - a social realist study which criticizes many key aspects of computerized police systems. 
Another hybrid work is Shoshana Zuboffs In the Age of the Smart Machine which is the most 
daunting and serious recent study which examines the labor processes and phenomenology of 
work with computer-based systems. She provides vivid and often brilliant descriptions of the 
phenomenology of work with special computer systems in specific work settings. She examines 
severa! cases of computerization in white collar offices and in the control room of a paper factory, 
thus giving the book the appearance of social realism. She draws on labor process theories of 
work, and develops an interesting theoretical argument. But her book is also driven by a 
significant anti-u to pian subtext since ali of her empirical cases ( and drawings which illustrate 
them) conclude that computerization has uniformly degraded work. The body of empirical 
research literature shows that computerization has not altered work in such a unidirectional 
manner and that there are many technological and social contingencies which Zuboff ignores 
(Kling and lacona, 1989). 
The books by Burnham and Zuboff illustrate only two of a myriad of hybrid patterns. Hybrid 
works are quite common. They can avoid sorne of the problems of their component genres if they 
are carefully developed ( e.g., Datawars by Kraemer, Dickhoven, Tierney and Klng, 1987 which 
mixes social relaism and analytical reduction); or they can suffer from sorne of the fatal problems 
of their underlying genres if their author~ do not take special pains to resolve these límits ( e.g, 
Zuboff, 1988). 
CONCLUSIONS 
1 have have identified five important genres in the literature which claims to describe the actual 
nature of computerization, the character of computer use, and the social choices and changes that 
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result from computerization: utopian, anti-utopian, social realism, analytical reduction and social 
theory. There are other genres, which 1 have ignored in arder to maintain sorne focus in a long 
paper. 1 have examined the character of these genres and sorne of their strengths and limits. 
Writings in each genre have formulaic limits, much in the way that romantic fictiori ( or any other 
literary genre) has important limits (Cawelti, 1976). Cawelti notes that "The moral fantasy of the 
romance is that of love triumphant and permanent, overcoming all obstacles and difficulties 
(Cawelti, 1976:41-42)." This does not mean that we can'.t b~ entertained or our appreciation of 
life enriched by romantic fictions; it is simply a genre with important formulaic limits. The moral 
fantasies of technological utopianism and anti-utopianism similarly limit the way that they can 
.teach us about the likely social realities of new forms of computerization: one is romantic arid the 
other is tragic. 1 am not arguing for sorne simple for of "balance" ~- and especially not for balance 
between the utopian .and anti-utopian genres. Life is more than a balance between romance and 
tragedy. (For example, neither romances nor tragedies frequently illustrate effective negotiations). 
1 am much more sympathetic to the empirically oriented genres -- social realism, social theory and 
analytical reduction, than to the utopian and anti-utopian lines of analysis which 1 find more 
credible. But 1 see the two utopian genres and legitimate, for they help explore the limits of the 
possible. Social realist accounts are usually so anchored in the present that they don't examine 
long term possibilities very well. The social theories of computerization are a relatively new mode 
of analysis in its infancy. Analytical reduction can be arcane for non-specialists and is usually 
·, limited to the tightly defined intellectual world of its key concepts ( and measures, if they are 
quantified). 
It is easy to identify the two utopian genres with ldeology and the three sociological genres with 
Science. This polarity captures important contrasts. But it is also too facile because all discourses, 
even scientific discourses, make ideological assumptions. Conversely, even the most blatantly 
ideological analysis can make sorne valid empirical claims. 
In the 1990s, there will be a large market for social analyses of computerization stimulated by: 
the steady stream of computing innovations; 
the drive by academic computer science departments and funding agencies such as NSF 
and DARPA to justify large expenditures on computing research; 
justifications for majar national computerization programs, such as the High Performance 
Computing Initiative; and 
articles examining life and technology in the 21st century. 
A large· fraction of this literature will be written by technologists and journalists for diverse 
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professional and lay audiences. However, utopian analyses are most likely to dominate the dis-
course because most authors will champion special computer technologists or align with their 
champions . 
the simplicity of technological utopianism and anti-utopianism is deceptive. But utopian and anti-
utopian lines of analysis are legitimate and useful genres far helping us to understand how new 
technologies expand the limits of the possibl~. But they are insufficient far creating an adequate 
literature about the social character of computerization. Moreover, organizations that have tried 
to computerize with utopian blueprints have often faund that actual technologies are much more 
costly, complex, and problematic while providing much less value than the utopian analysts suggest 
when they are taken literally. 
The actual uses and 1t;onsequences of developing computer systems depends upon the "way the 
world works." Conversely, computerized systems may slowly, but inexorably, change "the way the 
world works" -- often with unfarseen consequences. A key issue is how to understand the social 
opportunities and dilemmas of computerization without becoming seduced by the social simplifica-
tions of utopian romance or to be discouraged by dystopian nightmares. 1 see both kinds of 
images as far too simplified. But they do serve to help identify an interesting and important set of 
social possibilities14. 
The main alternatives, social realism, social theory, and analytical reduction, are less likely to be 
produced in comparable quantity. They are relatively subtle, portray a more ambiguous world, and 
have less rhetorical power to capture the imagination of readers. However, social realists have not 
developed systematic strategies far analyzing the social character of powerful technologies that are 
not yet available, in use, far the kind of highly nuanced empirical observation which is the 
hallmark of the genre15. Journalists probably produce the largest number of social realist 
14 New technologies do serve to expand the range of the possible. Jet planes make it po¿sible far 
an intact nuclear family to have dinner in a different time zone each night next week. But the 
envelope of typical activities is much smaller than the world of the possible. Most intact nuclear 
families will have dinner in the same time zone every night this week. This does not mean that jet 
planes are useless. Nor do the periodic crashes of jet planes and failures of complex systems -- which 
on rare but important cases, fail badly -- mean that we should take their failures as a way to predict 
their everyday behavior. But even when infrequent failures are also routine, they cannot be wholly 
ignored, such as when systems are designed and staffed to insure safer operations. 
15 There are high quality social realist accounts which examine the social dilemmas of emerging 
computerized systems. See far example, Bellin and Chapman (1987) and Laudan (1986). However, 
these studies are highly particularistic. The articles in Bellin and Chapman's book examine computer-
ized weapons systems without giving a clue how one might undertake social realist examinations of 
other kinds of computerized systems. Similarly, Laudan examines the social dimensions of large police 
data systems without giving many clues about how one might study future computerized systems in 
very different kinds of settings, such as automated battlefields. 
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accounts, although they also write stories which fit within the utopian genres. Social theory and 
analytical reduction are the specialty of social scientists and relatively inaccessible to non-
specialists. Few scholars have examined computerization with a social theoretical perspective. The 
scholarly literature about computerization is relatively unknown to journalists, computer scientists, 
and computer professionals. 
Even though they are much more scientific than the utopian genres, the sociological genres don't 
seem to appeal to many scientists and engineers. Sorne technologists dismiss social realist accounts 
as "primarily anecdotal," and they have little patience for social theory. For example, articles from 
these genres are rarely published in Scientific American, Science, and IEEE publications. 
Fortunately, they appear periodically in sorne ACM journals, such as Communications and 
Transactions on Information Systems. 1 see the development of systematic social analyses of 
computerization -- that are both credible and compelling -- as a majar challenge for the 1990s. 
It is ironic that computing -- often portrayed as an instrument of knowledge -- is primarily the 
subject of a popular and professional literature which are heavily weighted towards the genres 
whose knowledge claims are most suspect. Conversely, the discourses whose claims as valid 
knowledge are strongest seems to have much less appeal in the engineering and scientific 
communities which develop the highest performance computing systems. 
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